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Abstract
Microcredit in developed countries behaves in a different way than in developing
countries. Not only are there bigger obstacles to surpass, like regulation and
heavy competition, but also the main driver for microcredit, peer pressure,
is almost inexistent. Microcredit institutions turn to a different technique to
ensure high repayment rates; they follow the loan using training and weekly
meetings. However, this procedure has high costs and the institutions must
plead for donations from public and private figures. Ensuring these donations
come with higher repayment rates. Thus, we will observe which characteristic
of a group loan has a positive or negative impact on the repayment rates using
data from the Quebec institution of the RQCC. These variables range from
gender to training hours and will be regressed using stata.
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Mikroúvery se ve vyspelých zemı́ch chovaj́ı jinak, než v zemı́ch rozvojových.
Nejen kvuli vetš́ım prekážkám, jako je regulace a težká konkurence, ale také
kvuli hlavńımu zpusobu vymáháńı mikroúveru a tlaku okoĺı, který témer neex-
istuje. Institut mikroúveru se obraćı k odlǐsné technice k zajǐsteńı vysoké mı́ry
spláceńı; ŕıd́ı pujcky pomoćı školeńı a týdenńıych setkáńı. Nicméne, tento
postup má vysoké náklady a instituce muśı žádat o dary z verejných nebo
soukromých zdroju. Zajǐsteńı techto daru s sebou nese vyšš́ı sazby spláceńı.
Proto budeme sledovat, která vlastnost skupiny pujcek má pozitivńı nebo nega-
tivńı dopad na spláceńı sazeb na základe údaju Quebecké instituce RQCC. Tyto
promenné se pohybuj́ı od pohlav́ı k výcvikovým hodinám a vrát́ı se použit́ım
stata.
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Topic characteristics We will try to observe the reasons why microcredit ex-
ists in developed countries and if it is effective. Our following interest in the
sphere of microcredit is cast upon the developed countries. The existence of mi-
crocredit in developing countries is no mystery and has a solid motivation, but
there are many microfinancial institutions that are spread out in the developed
countries where their economic effectiveness should be questioned. Thus, we
will gather information about the economic environment and banking system.
Moreover, we will analyze the effect of the various characteristics that compose
a group loan over their repayment rates. Data will be taken from multiple
organisations within the province of Quebec (RQCC) and Statistics Quebec.
Hypothesis 1 Microcredit has a place in developed countries due to a per-
centage of population that are excluded from formal institutions.
Hypothesis 2 Services provided by these institutions are effective cost wise.
Hypothesis 3 Business training hours have a positive effect on repayment
rates for group loans.
Methodology We will mostly gather data from various organisations and
compile them. Data about average revenue, GINI coefficient, percentage of
low income households, wealth by region disparity, etc. As well as some data
on the standard banking system and brief explaining on minimal standard
requirements for credit loans. We will also gather data on group loans in Quebec
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with various characteristics and regress the variables over the repayment rates
for the groups.
Outline For this thesis, we will begin by analyzing the aspects of microcredit
in developed countries. We will enumerate and expand on these characteristics
that are crucial for the structure of microcredit. After a brief introduction to
the province of Quebec, we will apply these aspects for Quebec and gather the
necessary information to analyze. This data is important to understand and
observe the mechanism of microcredit in Quebec. For example, the portion of
population that does not have access to formal credit and reasons that explains
why. We will also look into the viability of microcredit by gathering data on
numerous institutions across Quebec. We will evaluate their returns, costs,
subventions and effective rate that will be built upon many other points such
as: employment creation, loan sizes, default rates, etc. An important term that
we will try to portrait within the scope of effectiveness is sustainability, which
is the lingering effect of creating businesses through microcredit. We will then
estimate the effects of each variable on the reimbursement rate for every group
loans and conclude with our results.
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To begin, we will define the subject at hand. This definition should be referred
to whenever it is mentioned. Microcredit has a long history, and therefore we
will only be using its current and latest form as it stands today. Microcredit
can be described as multiple small loans to individuals that are refused access
to formal credit. The following interest in the sphere of microcredit is cast upon
the developed countries; since, it is effective worldwide and is most popularly
known in developing countries to alleviate poverty. We will investigate into the
work of microfinancial institutions within developed countries.
The existence of microcredit in developing countries is no mystery and has
a solid motivation, but there are many microfinance institutions (MFIs) that
are spread out in the developed countries where their economic effectiveness
should be questioned. Their mission is seen by many as charity work instead of
proper microfinance. We will be presenting some developed countries’ profiles
for the matter, but mostly analyze the Canadian province of Quebec as a proxy.
Quebec has had a long history of cooperative credit and microfinance. The
community that surrounds it is stable and provides sound data for analysis.
The aim of this paper is twofold: first to assess the direct and indirect impact
of microcredit in Quebec and second to observe the effects on reimbursement
rates of business training hours, amongst other characteristics, over group loans
in Quebec. We will take a look at the developed countries Achilles’ heel: group-
based schemes and more specifically, group homogeneity factors, such as: age,
gender, income, language and education. Thus, acknowledging if groups loans
made of individuals with different levels of income, education, training hours,
etc. are more effective in terms of reimbursement rate than other groups.
Various languages within the borrowing community of microcredit seem to be
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a unique factor, since it can only be found in countries with high immigration
levels and a diversified population that correspond to Canada and the United
States.
Microcredit in developed countries has a vastly different structure than in
the developing ones. This is due to the distinctive economic environment and
the different type of clientele. The original microcredit model takes up many
challenges when adapting to the new environment.
In order to observe and configure the whole output of microcredit in Que-
bec, we will structure this paper in the following way: starting with a quick
overview of the population of Quebec in order to understand the stemming of
microfinance institutions, then an outline of the data that support the micro-
financial sphere of developed countries and followed by a report to define the
body of formal credit. Furthermore, we will present the collection of current
literature that is in line with the subject.
Ensuing this, we will verify our main hypothesis that business training hours
have a positive impact over reimbursement rates in group-lending schemes. Do
to so, we will estimate every group factor over the reimbursement rates using
the statistical program Stata. The data is provided by the “Reseau quebecois
du credit communautaire” or RQCC, which collectively represents all of the





Starting with a population overview to validate the environment in which the
microfinancial institutions are working with. All the population data in the
following section comes from the “Institute of Statistics of Quebec”. Since the
modern microfinancial institutions in Quebec started growing around the year
2000 according to the RQCC, we selected the span of years from 2000 to 2009.
Figure 2.1: Revenue and Spending for the province of Quebec in 2011,
in M$
Source: author’s research.
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To give a good idea of where funds come and go from, using the assumption
that the data is similar, give or take 2 years, the table above shows where
the Quebec government makes its revenue and where it spends it. The total
of 90.6 bn$ taken from various sources has 31% of it coming from individual
direct taxation, 30% from indirect taxation and 4% from individual current
transfers. This revenue mostly represents the tax burden from the middle and
rich classes of the society. Even though the poor pay taxes, their contribution
is understandably very low. Moreover, if we look at the spending, we can see
that 16% of the 89 bn$ spent are redirected in current transfers to individuals.
Again, by inference, these funds are generally absorbed by the lower class. We
can come to a broad conclusion that about 10% of the revenue generated by
taxes from the population is dedicated directly to the poor. Meaning that the
province of Quebec has a strong sense of equality amongst classes.
Figure 2.2: GINI Coefficient for all households in Quebec from 2000-
2009, in %
Source: author’s research.
As we can see, the province of Quebec has a fairly low GINI coefficient
which proves that the state has a strong approach in wealth transfers. The
lower the coefficient, the higher the total wealth is equally divided amongst the
population.
Figure 2.3: LICO after tax per individual in Quebec from 2000-2009,
in $CAD
Source: author’s research.
The LICO represents the threshold of low income cut-off after tax per indi-
vidual. Meaning that every individual that has an after tax income lower than
the LICO for the respective year are considered poor. We observe a huge in-
crease over 10 years, which proves that, withholding inflation, the government
adjusted its measure to consider the overall increase in real income for all the
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population. In 2000, if your income was 11 000$ you were considered poor; but
in 2009 with an income of 16 000$ you are considered poor.
Figure 2.4: Rate of low income for the province of Quebec from 2000-
2006, in %
Source: author’s research.
These figures represent the rate of low income in percentage points for
the province of Quebec. In other words, we observe that around 15% of the
population in Quebec is considered poor. This figure was stable over a 7 year
span. We can ask ourselves: are microfinancial institutions ineffective or did
they help keep these figures low?
Figure 2.5: Average yearly employment for the province of Quebec
from 2000-2009, in 1000
Source: author’s research.
We have decided to observe employment figures instead of unemployment
since it is a better indicator for economic policies. Simply put, there was a
positive increase in employment every year, except for 2009 when the financial
crisis hit Canada.
The numbers above show the after tax disposable income per household
for each region over a 3 year span. During these 3 years, we observe a steady
increase in income for all regions. The poorest region, Gaspesie-Iles-de-la-
Madeleine, is formed by a small population that subsists mostly on tourism and
fishing. Otherwise, all regions in Quebec have very similar income levels. We
can find one surprise by looking at the year 2008 for the region Nord-du-Quebec.
The disposable income per household for that region in 2008 is abnormally high
(47,729$). This is explained by the fact that in 2008 the Canadian government
gave 1.1 bn$ to the native “Cree” regional administration in order to settle the
question of the implementation of the James Bay agreement.
The microfinancial institutions which are active in Quebec function in a
financially healthy environment where the government makes a sustainable ef-
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Figure 2.6: Disposable income per household within administrative
regions of Quebec from 2007-2009, in $
Source: author’s research.
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fort to reduce poverty. Although there appears to be a reasonably prosperous
atmosphere, in which transfers are significant, there is 15% of the population
that seems to stay under the LICO. Knowing that microfinancial institutions
receive capitalization from various sources, are those investments being used
properly and effectively?
Chapter 3
Microcredit in developed countries
In this part, we will try to paint a portrait of the overall influence and size of
microcredit institutions that operate in developed countries. Although we are
using a Canadian province instead of the country itself, we will use it as a proxy
for developed countries. The reason behind this choice is because Canada is too
large as a country on a geographic scale. Its population is scattered around and
is very heterogeneous. Also, the province of Quebec is mostly appealing since all
of its microfinancial institutions are regrouped under one entity that manages
all the data collected. In addition, Quebec possesses a strong history of financial
solidarity that dates back to the famous “Caisse populaire Desjardins” which
is now the largest association of credit unions in North America. Furthermore,
Quebec represents a perfect cultural and financial mix between the American
and European theatre.
3.1 Canadian Profile
Microcredit in Canada began under the form of credit unions at the start of
the 20th century. It was initiated by cooperatives that provided saving and
credit services to people who did not have access to formal financial services.
Nowadays, there are 2 major microcredit institutions that operate in Canada:
Alterna Savings and VanCity. “Alterna Savings is a member-owned provider
of financial services serving nearly 120,000 members with an asset base now ex-
ceeding $2 bn. Participants of the program generally have poor credit ratings
or no credit history, and the majority have a personal annual income or assets
of less than $30,000 a year. Loans offered range from $1,000 to $15,000 and the
average loan disbursed is about $5,000. Alterna charges borrowers an interest
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rate equivalent to 6% over their prime lending rate and an administration fee
of 6% of the total amount borrowed. To date, Alterna has granted over $1.5
million in loans to more than 340 entrepreneurs with an average default rate
of a little over 9% per year”1. On the other hand, VanCity is Canada’s largest
credit union with assets of over $14.4 bn and serves more than 414,000 mem-
bers. “In 2009, their Community Leadership portfolio, consisting of personal
and business loan products and socially responsible mutual funds and real-
estate development was valued at $1.15 bn, 4.7% of total assets/funds under
administration in that year”2.
Many commercial banks are developing new products for the low-income
entrepreneurs’ sector; however, of Canada’s four major chartered banks, only
Scotiabank has been directly involved in microfinance and its activities are
concentrated exclusively in the developing world. A sustainable initiative in-
dependent of government has yet to emerge for other microfinance institutions
to emulate. Most microfinance institutions still operating today are alive at
the grace of government subsidies. Therefore, Canadian microfinance ventures
still have the opportunity to learn from the mistakes of their predecessors and
to conceive an alternative program that provides a sustainable response to the
poverty of access and opportunity (Reynolds 2011).
3.2 European country profiles, source: Eurostat
3.2.1 France
With a population of 13% below the poverty line, France finds itself to be the
country in Europe where microfinance activity is the most developed. Various
foundations were created during the 80’s to facilitate local business develop-
ment. In the past twenty years, the legislative and regulatory framework set
evolved to allow a more consistent growth of microfinance in the country. In line
with one of the main obstacles of microfinance in developed countries, France
has implemented the “Law for the Economic Initiative” in 2003 and the “Law
for small and medium enterprises” in 2005 that simplify registration procedures
for the status of self-employment. France also recognizes the importance of the
process of self-entrepreneurship and aims to further promote access to support
job creation as a way of returning to work.
1www.alterna.ca
2Vancity, “We Can All Be Wealthy: 2008-2009 Accountability Report,” 2009.
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3.2.2 Great-Britain
In Britain, the population below the poverty line is drastically high with 19%.
All financial activity is governed by the Financial Services Authority where they
do not list microfinance as a specific sector. Seemingly there is a general lack of
control on the price of credit since there is no wear rate defined in the UK. The
government’s interest in microfinance as a tool to fight against social exclusion
is also done through a number of programs implemented in recent years. These
include the “Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme” which provides benefits for
banks lending to people that are normally excluded from the system and the
“Community Investment Tax Relief” that encourages investment in “Commu-
nity Development Finance Associations” through tax benefits. Unfortunately,
there has been a decrease in microloan funding and their total volume in recent
years, mainly due to the financial crisis hitting Europe.
3.2.3 Germany
The economic powerhouse of Europe is not spared from total poverty. With
a similar figure to Quebec’s, Germany has 15% of its population below the
poverty line. In Germany, the microfinance sector is developing gradually, but
only the banking sector is authorized to provide credit, which forces MFIs to
enter agreements with banks to make loans. The industry is changing, even if
microfinance is still a young business. The lack of funding and a general lack of
resources affect the overall activity, especially private organizations. In addi-
tion, the lack of regulatory framework makes it difficult to access comprehensive
data on lending volumes, objectives and performance.
3.2.4 Czech Republic
Comparing to other countries, the Czech Republic has only 10% of its pop-
ulation below the poverty line. But it does not look good with 17% of its
population financially excluded. The concept of micro-enterprise does not ex-
ist as such and are not covered by specific legislation. In financial procedures,
conditions and legal framework are the same as for small and medium enter-
prises. These regulations are not very favorable, whether it is for accounting
procedures or regulation over contracts. As of today, there is dim hope for
small businesses that seek funding.
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Table 3.1: Challenges in the European Union
 Competition from well-developed private sector, making
chances of survival of a small business much lower than in
developing contexts.
 Functional, but poorly designed welfare system and specifi-
cally lack of incentives for people to graduate off welfare into
self-employment.
 Low levels of financial literacy (linked with higher risk of over-
indebtedness), lack of specialized skills to run a small busi-
ness.
 Excessive regulation on the microenterprise level as well in-
stitutional level (for MFIs) making the entry barriers for
MFIs much higher than in the developing countries. At the
MFI level, the legal and regulatory obstacles make lending
to micro-enterprises inefficient (Romania) or impossible (Ger-
many, where only banking institutions can engage in provision
of credit).
 Excessive regulation on the microenterprise level as well in-
stitutional level (for MFIs) making the entry barriers for
MFIs much higher than in the developing countries. At the
MFI level, the legal and regulatory obstacles make lending
to micro-enterprises inefficient (Romania) or impossible (Ger-
many, where only banking institutions can engage in provision
of credit).
 Availability of consumer finance often at very high interest
rates.
Source: Microfinance Center, http://www.mfc.org.pl/.
Chapter 4
Formal Banking
In this section, we will go through the formal credit and loan application re-
strictions. This is necessary, in order to understand why microcredit is growing
in developed countries. Credit restrictions are different in every country, but
mostly similar in developed countries. Most of the information in this section
was taken directly from “Low Income Entrepreneurs and their Access to Fi-
nancing in Canada, especially in the Province of Quebec/City of Montreal” by
Chantelle Reynolds and Christian Novak.
Recipients of microcredit loans tend to be small entrepreneurs who need
credit to implement or expand their business but lack credit because the loans
required are too small for conventional institutions, they have poor credit his-
tories, lack necessary collateral, or are recent immigrants.
In order to understand microfinance in Canada, it is necessary to study the
general business climate and demand for small loans. As microfinance targets
low-income entrepreneurs, it is interesting to determine what their needs are
and whether they feel they are underserved. A 2010 study1 of current and future
entrepreneurs in Canada noted that 63.4% of ventures cite current financial
obstacles as one of their main obstacles to creating or taking over a business.
The fear of future financial obstacles, such as going into debt or losing regular
income, was also cited by 35.2% of respondents as a major obstacle. According
to this study, the “Anatomy of the Canadian Entrepreneur” is a man between
35 and 54 years who is well off financially and more educated than the general
population. Only about 20% of respondents declared their personal income
to be below $20,000 (the approximate Canadian poverty line for a family size
of 1-2). It is this 20% that microfinance should target, and although The
1BDC and la Fondation de l’Entrepreneurship, “Canadian Entrepreneurship Status 2010”,
July 2010.
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Anatomy of the Canadian Entrepreneur is generally outside this range, it is
helpful to recognize that access to financial resources is a problem among small
and medium-sized entrepreneurial population. A demographic breakdown of
serial entrepreneurship (those involved in more than one entrepreneurial phase:
venture, ownership, closure) reveals that younger entrepreneurs have a higher
demand for financial resources to grow their business as well as greater intent
to grow (Reynolds 2011).
In 2005, the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada2 (FCAC) conducted a
survey to determine reasons individuals may not have a chequing or savings
account and their experiences in being rejected for an account from a financial
institution. Of the 5,000 people surveyed, 4% said they have been refused
an account by a financial institution in aggregate. This probability is highest
among:
 those with lower educational attainment (peaking at 8% among those
with an education level below a high school diploma)
 those with lower household incomes (peaking at 8% among those who
earn less than $30K annually)
 younger Canadians (peaking at 6% among those between the ages of 18
and 34)
 men (5% among all surveyed men) relative to women (4% among all
surveyed women)
 residents of Alberta (6% among all surveyed Alberta residents), BC (5%),
and Ontario (5%), compared to those in Saskatchewan/Manitoba (3%)
and Quebec (3%)
When posed the question “which of the following types of accounts is closest
to the kind you were rejected?” with the ability to cite more than one account,
the most common responses were credit cards (41%), followed by chequing
accounts (24%), lines of credit (18%) and savings accounts (18%). Another ten
percent of those who were rejected an account by a financial institution have
been applications for a mortgage while 6% have been for a loan.
The most common justification for account refusal was “poor credit rat-
ing/had declared bankruptcy” is, with 35% of total refusals on this basis. Other
2Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, “Public Experience with Financial Services and
Awareness of the FCAC ,” March 24th , 2005
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reasons given include: “not employed/inadequate income” (13%) and “don’t
have proper identification/driver’s license” (5%). Almost one in ten (9%) say
they were given no reason for being refused an account at a financial institution
while the remaining 28% cited “other” and “don’t know” (Reynolds 2011).
Once an individual has exhausted the options offered by traditional financ-
ing institutions, in the absence of microcredit programs, many must turn to
loan sharks to meet their financial needs. Payday loans are short-term con-
sumer loans for small amounts. The client’s next paycheck is treated as collat-
eral. Borrowers give payday loan companies a post-dated check for the amount
of the loan plus any associated fees and interest. The average loan in Canada
is approximately $300 for a term of two weeks. As payday lenders do not check
credit history, and as clients are typically financially vulnerable, loans often





Modern microfinance in developed countries has well been established for over
a decade now. Since its implementation there has been various theories about
its efficiency. Upon further research, the stigmatism remains in the challenges
provided by its implementation. These challenges mostly revolve around the
general lack of funding and the lending process that is mired by its particular
diversification. In other words, the individuals or groups that borrow from this
system are very different and do not fastidiously promote solidarity. And as we
know, the concept of solidarity is the one that drives the model of microcredit
in developing countries. This is why the microcredit model in developed coun-
tries is different than in developing countries and is adapted to its environment.
As is turns out, one of the main reasons why microcredit in developed countries
does not have high repayment rates is the deficiency of social capital (Gomez
& Santor 2003). Likewise, the disparity in funding is a surprising factor for
developed countries since skepticism towards efficiency drives away donations.
With this in mind, microfinancial institutions strive towards sustainability and
social assistance, but there seems to be a woeful tradeoff between the two.
In transition, the savings segment is more sensitive than the lending due to
the association of costs and regulations within depository institutions (Fiebig
M. Hannig & Wisniwski 1999). Due to the individualistic state of developed
countries, there has been competition that pressures efficiency and cost reduc-
tion and as a result, adaptation and innovation flourish (Christen & Drake
2001).
There has been some criticism towards the major challenges that have been
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brought up. It is mainly argued that microcredit could be a result for a failed
credit market and that individualism breaks away solidarity in group schemes.
However, microfinancial institutions that use individual based lending instead
of group based generate more profit, but are not as focused on the poor (Hermes
& Lensink 2007). Being an important goal for microcredit to alleviate poverty,
it seems to be another tradeoff that should be circumvented. In the same line
of thought, there is another competitor to microcredit in developed countries,
as it is seemingly easy to obtain a credit card and make reasonably small loans
with it. And if microfinancial institutions in developed countries did not have
enough problems as it was, there are regulatory constraints that cap interest
rates and limit potential profitability (Morduch & Schreiner 2001). There is
proof that interest rate caps can do more harm than good when banks must
publish percentage rates, especially when they charge the poor more than the
rich (Krahnen & Reinhard H. 1994).
Following the group dynamics, in developed countries, lenders fail to man-
age groups properly and the opportunity cost of group participation is high (Mor-
duch & Schreiner 2001). “If group members doubt that programs will re-
ally make them pay each other’s debts, they will shirk the unpleasant task
of pressuring delinquent borrowers, and program staff must do most enforce-
ment” (Hung 2001). “Microfinance works best when the individual actors in-
volved have a self-interested reason to make it work. For example, unless
borrowers repay their loans as promised, microfinance is little more than a
thinly veiled cash-transfer program—a First Way solution. And although most
borrowers who repay their loans probably do so more because they are honest
than because they fear the costs of default, incentives that increase the cost
of default and/or increase the benefit of repayment can only improve repay-
ment” (Morduch & Schreiner 2001).
Previous studies have shown that group lending schemes in developing coun-
tries have both positive and negative effects on repayment rates. The positive
effect is due to successful group members who will have the incentives to help
out unsuccessful group members to make repayment worthwhile. As for the
negative effect, it will arise when the whole group defaults. The group lending
scheme produces what is called social collateral that helps mitigate the negative
effect. The key feature in group lending is joint liability. This means that all
group members are treated as being in default if any one of the members does
not repay his loan. We find out that penalties that stem from defaulting cause
fear within the group at an individual level and thus causes a peer pressure
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trigger system upon those who wish to fail strategically or accidentally (Besley
1991).
Furthermore, a study from the Bank of Canada proves that group lending
improves borrower performance. Microfinance institutions have been successful
because of innovative use of peer group lending. There was little evidence
to suggest that group-lending schemes outperform individual borrowers, but
the study showed that group lending lowers borrower default rates more than
individual rates. The effect is channeled through the selection process and
the greater group borrower effect. The positive effect of selection does not
eliminate the significance of the peer group effect, which indicates that greater
effort (not sorting) is the dominant channel by which group lending improves
borrower performance (Gomez & Santor 2003).
Although without having to show the data to support this statement, micro-
credit is more effective in developing countries for obvious reasons. But, never-
theless, it is rapidly growing in developed countries and continuously adapting
to fit the market. Furthermore, we can identify its progress in terms of group
based lending schemes, business teachings, savings as funding and financial
stability.
5.2 Differences
Moreover, the microfinancial institutions in developed countries should be an-
alyzed separately from the ones in developing countries and should not be
compared, as we have previously stated (Painter & Tang 2001). In order to un-
derstand this conundrum, data from third world institutions have shown that
group based lending increases household production and consumption (Ander-
son & Locker 2002). But, research shows that group based lending in devel-
oped countries is unsuccessful due to problematical group dynamics (Morduch
& Schreiner 2001). In other words, the original microcredit peer pressure con-
cept is flawed because of the individualistic behavior that the developed world
environment creates. Thus, group schemes are less interesting since they are
almost ineffective. The developed world and third world microcredit are dis-
tinct and should not be compared. However, we will go through the arguments
that will clarify the concept of microcredit in developed countries. Starting
with a simple notion: the size of the microenterprise sector or the potential
market for microfinance, is much smaller in developed countries, which creates
a problematic in reaching a larger scale than in developing countries (Hung
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2001). Additionally, scaling programs reduce costs per transaction and have
broader impacts. Furthermore, microenterprises are a lot more common in de-
veloping countries, where only a small percentage of micro borrowers decide
to be self-employed (Bates 1997). This is mainly due to the working poor
class in developed countries who turn to wage jobs because self-employment
has longer hours, higher risk and less pay (Schreiner 1999). Another reason
behind this factor is owed to public safety nets that serve as an alternative to
self-employment which make the incentives to go in self-employment weaker.
“The safety net, like the abundance of wage jobs, places a floor on the reser-
vation wage of potential micro entrepreneurs. It may even sap entrepreneurial
spirits as people learn not to look to self-employment for their livelihoods in
bad times” (Novogratz 1992).
5.3 Progress
Therefore, a novel approach is converging towards an intricate market commer-
cialization being the only long term answer in a viable industry. Light is shed
on the leading institutions which use this approach (Christen & Drake 2001).
Precariously, the institutions that rely solely on private and public funding are
at the mercy of market fluctuations. Thus, to gain a strong foothold in sta-
bility, commercialization is the solution for sustainability (Christen & Drake
2001).
With that said, the economic environments and cultures have a significant
impact on the mechanics of the microcredit model. Solidarity is overestimated
in developed countries, but poor individuals will always try harder to contribute
in their way to the economy. “In developing countries, microfinance has been
the darling of the development community, and in developed countries, microfi-
nance fits well with Third Ways ideas’ (Morduch & Schreiner 2001). In general,
since microcredit in developed countries is so different than in developing ones,
their goal should be different. In other words, instead of helping poor people
start businesses they should concentrate efforts on existing ones: “Public efforts
to assist entrepreneurs should not attempt to increase the number of business
starts but instead should concentrate on reducing failures among those already
operating” (Morduch & Schreiner 2001). Having the two possibilities, choosing
to invest effort in people who already have small business training (i.e.: self-
employed) is more effective than fostering someone that has none. Otherwise,
costs of training and staff hiring are greater. “As poverty increases, cost in-
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creases, and so at some point, the benefit that a poor entrepreneur might derive
from microfinance is smaller than the cost” (Morduch & Schreiner 2001). The
latter being true nevertheless, microfinance does not exist to make profits, but
as a redistribution tool that can cause positive spill overs (Morduch & Schreiner
2001). Institutions that work with donations can only prove the direct effect
of their work, but it is implausible to encompass the total indirect effect it has
on its respective society.
While analysing the repayment performance in developing countries, we can
induce a logical pattern that can be applicable to developed countries. We find
out that higher repayment rates will cut interest rates to borrowers, which will
in turn create a higher resource allocation and reduces dependence of subsidies
that will improve sustainability. Usually, donors will attribute funds depend-
ing on repayment rates. Thus, in the institutions interest, special mechanisms
should be in place to increase this rate, i.e.: larger loans to borrowers with
low risk and attempts to reduce delay in repayments. Major factors that in-
fluence repayment rates are mostly due to information asymmetries (adverse
selection and moral hazard) or adverse shocks affecting borrowers. Credit ra-
tioning and collateral requirement should be necessary to protect institutions
against asymmetry, but are rendered invalid by the state of the borrowers. In
other words, jointly liable lending groups help enforce repayment as social in-
teractions make strategic default costly (Besley 1991). Social ties and group
homogeneity represented by a default probability are also indirectly linked to
repayment performance as they facilitate peer monitoring, since there happens
to be an effective peer selection of group members. The increase of homogene-
ity in a group in terms of risk, interests and economic power should increase
repayment rates. Although we would think that heterogeneity in the risk level
of a group should push towards a diversification pattern and thus lower the
overall risk, it is not true. Group homogeneity of age and education in devel-
oping countries have no apparent significant impact on repayment performance
(Wydick 1999). On the contrary, group homogeneity in terms of risk as a result
of peer selection has a negative impact on repayment (Zeller 1998).
Furthermore, we investigate the funding proportion of microfinance institu-
tions. Donations and loans are made directly to the institutions, but there also
exists what we call microfinance investment vehicles or MIV’s that act as an
intermediary between investors and the final microfinance institutions (Janda
& Svarovska 2012). “While many investors choose to invest into MIV’s be-
cause of their socially responsible character, these investors also have to take
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into account the financial returns of their investment into MIV’s”1. There are
two prospects that are analyzed in respect to a good investment: fund returns
and risk diversification potential. With more funding, evidently, microfinance
institutions can expand and improve their services (Janda & Svarovska 2012).
Investors will prefer to invest in MIV’s than directly into the microfinance in-
stitutions. “Some funds, therefore, suggest that the investment in funds’ shares
should be viewed as a medium to long-term investment. Bearing in mind the
still rather high specific risk of microfinance investment, an inclusion of micro-
finance assets intended to lower portfolio’s overall market exposure is desirable
when the current portfolio is already well diversified against the unsystematic
risk’2.
5.4 Training
Microfinance institutions in developing countries do not have the experience nor
expertise in business training, as most large third world institutions make loans
but do not offer training (Morduch & Schreiner 2001). The business training
is derived from the fact that in developed countries, human capital constraints
are more important than financial constraints. “The service sector offers more
opportunities for microenterprises, although service firms may still not provide
a steady income. In promising news for microenterprises, as households become
richer, they tend to demand more customized services. Many service jobs
require little human capital and so may be within the reach of poor, unskilled
people, but this also means that they do not pay well’ (Morduch & Schreiner
2001).
Since the debate on microfinancial institutions in developed countries re-
volves around business training, there is much research that has been done on
their particular effect. We may ask, ceteris paribus, a simple question: should
we subsidize the loans or the business training? The developed countries have
institutions and organizations that propel innovation and production, but also
cause hindrance to the skill-less population. For example, you need a permit
to start fishing and selling it on your own in most developed countries. Hav-
ing concluded that training is essential in developed countries, it is not easy
1Janda, Rausser and Svarovska (2012). Can investment in Microfinance funds improve
risk return characteristics of a portfolio? Institute of Economics.
2Janda, Rausser and Svarovska (2012). Can investment in Microfinance funds improve
risk return characteristics of a portfolio? Institute of Economics.
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to distinguish which type. There are two main types of training that can be
given, which are considered polar opposites. The first and simplest technique
is to have guest speakers or general entrepreneurship classes that can explain
the risks that are associated with small businesses. These will most of the time
have an effect of discouragement and bad businesses will be dropped. “Evi-
dence suggests that the main effect of general entrepreneurship classes may be
to warn potential entrepreneurs of the risks that they may face. Good gen-
eral classes may discourage small ventures more than they encourage them”
(Schreiner, 1999). On the other end of the spectrum we can find customized
help on stand-by. In other words, when people encounter a problem they can
have someone help treat it. This is the most cost efficient approach, but this
will have the effect of leaving the borrowers with less preparation. There exists
a balance between the two, but in this type of venture, being cost efficient is
most important.
A study on business training for microfinance emerged in 2011. Basically, a
training program for groups in developing countries was set-up using the credit
with education model. Clients were assigned to treatment or control groups, in
which treatment groups received between 30 to 60 minutes of training session
every week and control groups had standard meetings solely to make payments.
The intention to treat led to higher repayment rates and client retention levels,
but also increased the groups’ revenues and reduced fluctuations (Frisancho V.
& M 2008).
Morduch & Schreiner (2001), states three questions about the optimal
supply of microfinance; First, given that resources are scarce and that funds
used for microfinance could benefit the poor in alternative uses, does the sum of
the direct and indirect benefits indeed exceed the cost of supply? In answering
this question, a second question must be asked: how valuable to society are the
benefits that accrue to the poor? Are funds spent cost-effectively relative to
alternative social investments? Third, if microfinance is worthwhile, then how
can society ensure that the supply is efficient and that programs work hard to
experiment to improve quality and reduce costs?
Chapter 6
Microcredit in Quebec
After approaching the largest institution of microcredit in Quebec (RQCC), we
received crucial data and information about the working mechanisms of micro-
credit in the province of Quebec. The RQCC is basically a regrouping of the
multiple microcredit institutions in almost every region of Quebec, which has
been active for over the past 10 years. The RQCC explains itself: community
credit is, in this sense, a last resort for people excluded and / or marginalized
and who want to take their place in society through an entrepreneurial project.
However, this last resort often becomes a first leverage mechanism, which then
gives them access to other sources of funding because the money from the micro-
credit can be considered as a personal investment. “Our funding is necessarily
coupled with individualized support that is required to guarantee repayment.
This support combines support for the individual and his project. The clientele
served acquires the skills related to the business in terms of life skills and know-
how. Our support secures the period before starting a well-crafted project and
shaping a competent contractor, as well as after the beginning of the repayment
of debt and the sustainability of the company”.
Most of its activities are produced by its 346 volunteers and 64 employees.
The data presented henceforth describes the total activity of microcredit within
the province of Quebec in the past 10 years, otherwise specified for the current
year of when the data was harvested in 2011-2012.
6.1 Representation of borrowers
The main source of income for individuals that demand loans stem from fi-
nancial assistance of last resort, which explains why these individuals would
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Figure 6.1: Main source of income of individuals who seek loans in
Quebec over 10 years
Source: author’s research.
be refused credit in formal institutions. Furthermore, there are 20% of loans
that are made to people that rely on unemployment security, followed by full
time employees (13.90%) and autonomous employees (13.79%), which makes
up about 50% of the clientele. The rest of the sources are less significant. Most
importantly, this table paints the same portrait of the typical individual who
will be refused credit in the standard institutions that we discussed earlier on.
Figure 6.2: Gender of individuals who seek loans in Quebec over 10
years
Source: author’s research.
Almost 57% of all loans are made to women and only 43% to men. This
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statistic seems balanced, knowing that the institutions in developing countries
show a stronger percentage towards female borrowers.
Figure 6.3: Age bracket of individuals on arrival in Quebec over 10
years
Source: author’s research.
The majority of loans are made to people between 26 and 49 years old.
Once more, the profile of the standard borrower is proven with the data.
Figure 6.4: Family status of individuals in Quebec
Source: author’s research.
We also provide the familial status of individuals who seek loans. The
borrowers are fairly divided in multiple groups from single parent to single,
couple with children and childless couple.
Clearly, 80% of the borrowers are either citizens or permanent residents.
This is due to the fact that because of regulations, it is difficult to set up a
business in Canada without the proper documentation provided.
Almost all of the data that represents ethno cultural community is not
available. This is probably due to the fact that when compiling data, the
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Figure 6.5: Status of borrowers in Quebec
Source: author’s research.
Figure 6.6: Ethnicity of borrowers in Quebec
Source: author’s research.
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cultural background of individuals was not taken into account before a certain
year.
Figure 6.7: Spoken language of borrowers in Quebec
Source: author’s research.
The main language spoken is French with 75%, followed by English with
almost 12%. Within the province of Quebec there is 85% of its population that
are Francophone and only 15% who are Anglophone or Allophone.
Figure 6.8: Level of education of borrowers in Quebec
Source: author’s research.
Surprisingly, 53% of borrowers possess a college or university education.
Only 21% only have a high school education. This information can prove that
individuals who request a loan already possess the aptitudes and knowledge to
perform better than individuals in developing countries, where education is less
accessible. From the point of view of the RQCC, the education level should
have an impact on reimbursement rates, but there is no study or data that
directly supports this.
Most of the people have an income between 10 000$ and 20 000$ with 35%,
followed by 20 000$ to 30 000$ with 23%. Interestingly, even with a mid-range
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Figure 6.9: Income level of borrowers in Quebec
Source: author’s research.
income level these individuals seek microcredit loans. This component shows
that income is not necessarily the driving force behind refusal of credit in formal
institutions.
We clearly can depict the population that seeks microcredit. It is obviously
entwined with the standards of other Canadian microborrowers, which proves
that the individual profile of borrowers is very similar in each case. When
asked what are the most common reasons why individuals seek microcredit?
The RQCC answered, “People come to us because they do not have access
to conventional bank loans (due to lack of collateral, non-existent or flawed
credit, need for small amounts, lack of business experience, etc.). Often they
do not have access to the standardized programs of institutions that support
entrepreneurship (do not have the minimum amount to deposit, does not fit
with the geographical areas and sectors, or either certain groups of age are
prioritized by the government bodies, etc.)”.
6.2 Representation of loans
The total amount of loans made out over the years is of 1698 and equivalent to
9 980 447$ with the average loan around 5878$. There is a huge discrepancy
when observing total project costs and total loans (principal only). This is
explained by the RQCC: Loans from members of the RQCC often come as
seed funds or loan guarantee. The participation of community credit allows a
more important contribution than of financial arrangements. The local support
offered often ensures the success of the company. Overall, every dollar invested
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Figure 6.10: Loan distribution for 2011 and all active years in Quebec
Source: author’s research.
by the RQCC has attracted investments of $ 5.74 from other socio-economic
actors in the environment, which increases the real impact of community credit
and proves its complementarity and its roots in the medium.
Figure 6.11: Refinanced loans for 2011 and all active years
Source: author’s research.
Projects that need refinancing are explained by the RQCC: “The main rea-
sons are the purchase of equipment to meet the increasing demand, the need for
cash or working capital or project diversification. Sometimes even once started,
the contractor still has no access to alternative sources of credit. Sometimes
the relationship of trust with the counselor encourages the contractor to re-
main within the RQCC. The Contractor must still provide a business plan and
forecasts. It remains the same style of accompanying from the 1st time”.
In this table we can see the creation of new businesses and jobs as well
as the maintenance of existing businesses and jobs. The RQCC explains the
concept of maintenance: “Among the clients served in our bodies, some have
an idea or business plan and are at the stage of the structuration. We then
accompany to validate the project, assess the viability and finalize the business
plan. From the point of view of compilation, we contribute to the creation of
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Figure 6.12: Direct effect of loans in Quebec
Source: author’s research.
a new company (with or without loan). In addition, when a customer arrives
to our members and is already in business, he is also entitled to the support
for his consolidation project or development for his existing business. That is
why, from the point of view of compilation, we say that our work has helped
to maintain existing businesses. So you can see that companies created and
maintained are not the same”.
Figure 6.13: Direct number of businesses created with loans invested
in every sector in Quebec for 2011 and all active years
Source: author’s research.
There is no surprise that most of the loans convert into the service sector.
According to studies, the other sectors have higher competition and are harder
to breakthrough. The service sector on the other hand can be very specialized
and thus create a niche demand that is sustainable and profitable. A large
proportion of entrepreneurs assisted by community credit have chosen self-
employment, presuming that the services sector is more appropriate for this
category of self-employed entrepreneurs.
In this case, most of the individual loans are used for self-employed busi-
nesses, with the rest scattered around.
This is an interesting take on microcredit in developed countries. It shows
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Figure 6.14: Direct number of businesses created with loans under
every type of form in Quebec for 2011 and all active
years
Source: author’s research.
Figure 6.15: Indirect effect of loans in Quebec for 2011 and all active
years
Source: author’s research.
that the institutions will do more than just provide loans. They provide support
in other forms and this helps to create and maintain jobs and businesses. Indi-
viduals that do not necessarily require a loan for the growth of their business
and other effects can seek advice and training from their respective institution.
Under this form, it may seem like a simple training institution, but without it
there would be a hole to support the lacking demand where it stands.
Figure 6.16: Indirect number of businesses created without loans for
2011 and all active years
Source: author’s research.
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If we compare the conversion of loans into sectors of activity, we can note
that the trickle down effect of loans follow the same pattern within the service
sector for the same reasons we mentioned previously.
Figure 6.17: Indirect number of businesses created without loans for
2011 and all active years
Source: author’s research.
In the table above, we simply have the same pattern for the majority of
loans who are directed in self-employment and have not required any loans. It
follows the two previous tables and is recognition of the greater mission that
the RQCC gives itself.
Figure 6.18: Reimbursement and survival rate of businesses created
for 2011 and all active years
Source: author’s research.
The RQCC explains the 69% survival rate and the follow up period: “In
Quebec, the average survival rate after 5 years is 34% (data from the Gov-
ernment of QC). We believe that the local support that we provide before
and after the loan makes the entrepreneur better equipped and stronger to get
through the difficult period of the first business year, which explains our high
survival rate. Indeed, a company or individual is followed on a regular basis
throughout the term of the loan, but then it is more sporadic (not mandatory)
as required. These customers are often invited to participate in networking
activities, or they are asked to share their experiences and their journey during
special events.” In other words, it remains in contact with the contractor, but
in another form.
The data for the year 2011-2012 appears in previous tables. The jobs created
and maintained are summed up for all active years with and without the use
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Figure 6.19: Total jobs created and maintained as well as total sales
for all active years
Current year Cumulative
Jobs - 3343
Jobs maintained - 2349
Total sales ($ thousands) - 6,161,689  $        
Source: author’s research.
of loans. The total sales simply represent the total financial package of all the
projects that have been funded for the year 2011-2012.
Figure 6.20: Rate of integration for each loan in 2011
Source: author’s research.
The integration rate shows how microcredit collaborates with society. This
rate is only available for the year 2011-2012 where we observe that the loans
converge into 3 main categories: start-ups, consolidation and pre-boot.
6.3 Representation of formation and business train-
ing
In this section we cover data that show the formation facet of microcredit in
Quebec. The RQCC explains its view on training: “In our jargon, we speak
of advisors and not teachers. Community credit is not an approach to class-
room training, but support for every customer from a support plan based on
the needs and the person / project consistency. Once the business plan is
completed, a loan committee analyzes it. In our analysis process, we consider
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conventional indicators, while adding specific parameters from our institution.
Our commitment to inclusion should not alter our analytical rigor. Our oper-
ating budget (including salaries) is largely funded by the Quebec government,
particularly the Ministry of Finance and Economics. This statement recognizes
our specialized expertise, which combines support for people in impoverished
areas and entrepreneurial development. The RQCC is a leader in social and
economic development in Quebec”.
Figure 6.21: Representation of hour repartition at the starting level
of a loan
Source: author’s research.
We want to pay attention to the number of average hours per project. We
can observe that there is little time attributed to telephone, email and group
meetings before lending and 2,5 hours attributed to individual meetings even
before a loan has been contracted.
Figure 6.22: Representation of hour repartition at the business plan
level of a loan
Source: author’s research.
Again, while observing the average hours per project during the business
plan session before lending, we realize a huge increase in hours. Not only do
the number of projects decrease, but also the number of hours increases vastly.
This session represents the most important part of the structure as it will map
out the rest of the proceedings.
Figure 6.23: Representation of hour repartition at the follow-up level
of a loan
Source: author’s research.
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The average number of hours per project proceeds with a slight decrease
during the period after the initial loan. This session is viewed as the support
and monitoring of the loan. It plays a crucial part in the progression of the
reimbursement rate.
Figure 6.24: Representation of hour repartition by various HR sec-
tions
Source: author’s research.
We can observe in the table above the complete partition of the hours in
various sectors. We want to draw your attention to the division of the resources;
most of the internal resources are concentrated on accompaniment and man-
agement, which represent the training hours. The promoting institutions spend
their time typically in management, with some time spread out to promotion
and animating socio-economic life. And as for the external resources, they are
spent on board and committee loans. The RQCC describes this separation:
“Overall, 40% of the time is devoted directly to contractors. However, member
organizations are independent entities; they must devote time to task manage-
ment and marketing communications. Most of our member organizations are
very small teams and each must put their shoulders together to carry out these
tasks”.
6.4 Representation of funding
As explained many times previously, the funding of the institution is what
makes it strive. Usually, funds are received based on the effectiveness of an
institution, but in some cases, other reasons are used to receive funds. In the
case of the RQCC: “The RQCC receives an operating grant from the Min-
istry of Finance and Economy for the operations of member organizations and
6. Microcredit in Quebec 35
permanence. This funding covers a good part of the operations, but mem-
bers must balance their budget by seeking other sources of funding, each in
its region. Furthermore, as the money lent to entrepreneurs does not originate
from grants, our members are constantly raising funds in their respective com-
munities. Religious communities are interested in the dimension of ’poverty
reduction’ or ’care of the person itself (empowerment)’ in our mission. This is
why many members can strive”.
Figure 6.25: Repartition of funding for 2011 and all active years from
various categories
Source: author’s research.
The technical costs or fixed costs are covered by the government as stated
above, but for the rest of the funding, the amounts come from four major
sources with donations leading at 36,5% of the total funds. The investments
can sometimes be volatile and unstable depending on the markets. Although
for 2011-2012, the amount of new money levied was 452 957$ with investments
without interest being the most prominent.
This table represents an interesting take on the source of donations. Reli-
gious communities are the most generous, as explained previously, followed by
financial institutions and other sources.
The amount of accumulated loans is bigger than the donations since the
institutions sometimes must meet some threshold to hold certain standards of
funding.
All of these numbers represent the structure of who borrows loans, why they
do it, where do the funds come from and where do they go. It is an important
picture that explains the essence of microcredit in Quebec. We want to show
why individuals need loans in Quebec and we want to understand why the
funding is necessary and at what level. It exemplifies the attributes from the
previous literary review for institutions in the structural way.
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Figure 6.26: Source of funds for 2011 and all active years from various
sectors
Source: author’s research.





In this part we will try and determine if there is causality between the multiple
human factors and the reimbursement rate of group lending schemes. We will
be using the data from the RQCC’s database over group loans. This data
ranges over multiple years and represents a cross sectional data selection of
the detailed characteristics of each of the group loans. The data was received
under multiple forms from various members of the RQCC and consolidated.
Because of this, some of the group loan data have only one main individual
who represents the group and in some cases the number of individuals forming
the group is of 1, since the data for other group members was unavailable. This
causes a weight attribution problem to the group loans, with some loans that
have more impact on final results. The number of group loans available is 65.
This is due to the fact that the data was manually harvested and quite difficult
to gather from the multiple bodies that create the RQCC. Therefore, we have
decided to merge the data accordingly and proceeded to create an average that
represents the individuals in every loan. We believe that this will prove a more
significant dataset to observe the real variations of each characteristic on the
repayment rate.
The variables included for each group loan are (see raw data in appendix):
 The year the loan has been obtained
 The duration of the loan in months
 The amount of the loan in CAD$
 The reimbursement rate of the loan in %
 The number of individuals participating in the loan
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 The age of every member participating in the loan (when available)
 The gender of every member participating in the loan (when available)
 The yearly income of every member participating in the loan (when avail-
able) in CAD$
 The spoken language of every member participating in the loan (when
available)
 The education level of every member participating in the loan (when
available)
 The total number of training hours given to the whole group for the loan
However, as explained, we will be using a modified dataset of merged aver-
aged attributes consisting in every loan (see modified data in appendix):
 The year, duration, amount, reimbursement rate, number of individuals
and total number of training hours do not change
 The age of every member is averaged
 The yearly income is averaged
 The spoken language keeps its value for the majority of the group
 The education level is changed to the average of the years of education
every member possesses
 The gender is specified as such:
– with proportion of women 50% or more
– with proportion of women less than 50%
7.1 Model
We apply standard OLS regression with robust standard errors using the fol-
lowing variables in stata:
 rate: reimbursement rate
 dur: duration
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 lamount: log amount of loan
 nind: number of individuals
 age: average age of individuals
 female: 1 if group female, 0 otherwise
 lgwagey: log of average gross yearly income
 lang: language of group (1,2,3)
 edu: average years of education
 thours: number of training hours
Table 7.1: OLS Regression
Case Coefficient P-value
Duration -0.35 0.083
Log of amount 8.11 0.008
Number of individuals -0.8 0.000
Age 0.2 0.381
Female -3.81 0.383





Training hours 0.06 0.306
Source: author’s computations.
We observe that the higher the duration is for the group loan, the lower
the repayment rate will be. Thus, for every extra month the loan is carried
on there appears to be a reduction in the repayment rate of 0.35 percentage
points. It does not seem to have a big effect, but considering how long most
of the loans are, there can be a decrease in reimbursement rate by almost 10
percentage points on average. This is probably due to the fact that groups,
who repay loans faster, already have the attributes to repay a loan in full; as
for groups that linger probably have difficulty in reimbursing the loan.
The logged amount of the loan has a positive effect on the repayment rate,
as for every percentage increase for the loan, there seems to be an increase of
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8.11 percentage points in the repayment rate. This can be explained by the
circumstance that groups who ask for bigger loans are well prepared in advance
to repay it and have passed the necessary criteria, which are tougher, in order
to receive such a loan.
The number of individuals within a group has a negative impact on the
reimbursement rate. For every extra member in a group, there is a sensible
decrease in repayment rates of 0.8 percentage points. We wish to confirm that
this is not necessarily the case for NGO’s or small firms, but only majorly
applies to group loans consisting of a few individuals, due to the nature of the
data.
The average age of a group seems to increase the repayment rate by 0.2
percentage points. It follows previous literature that describes an increase in
age should have a positive effect on repayment rate, but also considers the age
parsimony within a group. We will consider this variable insignificant, since we
cannot incorporate the value for the age of each group member.
Being in a group that consists mostly of females has a standard negative
effect on the repayment rate by 3.81 percentage points. As explained earlier, it
would have been more interesting to view the effect of each individual male or
female variable on the total repayment rate, but was considered insignificant
due to the nature of the data. Therefore, this variable will be considered
insignificant.
For every increase in percentage on the average income of the group, there
seems to be a decrease in repayment rates. This factor does not seem to
correspond to the present literature. Higher income should represent a higher
repayment rate. Since the group’s income is averaged, there is a possibility
that some members with low incomes do not perform well within the group
and therefore drags the results downwards. We will be considering this variable
insignificant due to the fact that we cannot differentiate the repayment weight
of each individual.
We can observe that the language variable has two effects. First, the groups
that speak English have a 6 percentage points better reimbursement rate than
French speaking groups. And second, the groups that speak Spanish have a
decrease of 15.65 percentage points in their reimbursement rate compared to
French speaking groups. Although very impressive, it is insignificant since there
are too few individuals that speak English or Spanish in the dataset. We will
also drop the average education years because we consider it insignificant for
the same reasons we omit the income variable.
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The training hours have a positive effect on the repayment rate of 0.6 per-
centage points per hour. This has also been reported in tests done in developing
countries, where the business training caused higher repayment rates and bet-
ter businesses. We can confirm our main hypothesis that training has a positive
effect on repayment rates for group loans.
We re-estimate the model using only the duration, the amount, the num-
ber of individuals and the number of training hours, since they represent the
characteristics of a group loan and not the individuals.
Table 7.2: Re-estimated OLS Regression
Case Coefficient P-value
Duration -0.38 0.055
Log of amount 6.52 0.005
Number of individuals -0.64 0.000
Training hours 0.08 0.111
Source: author’s computations.
Our results are based on the fact that our data has been averaged in order
to get reasonable results over group loans. These loans, however, span over 7
years and were randomly selected from various regions around Quebec.
After omitting some insignificant variables we can observe a decrease for the
duration and the amount, but an increase for the number of individuals and
the number of training hours. The variables become slightly more significant
in our model, but our R-squared has decreased by 0.10 (see appendix).
We then proceed to generate a fully repaid variable that will take the value
of 1 if the repayment rate is 98% or higher and 0 otherwise. We want to see
the marginal effects of each variable on the repaid binary variable.





Number of individuals -0.037 0.170
Training hours -0.007 0.162
Source: author’s computations.
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The increase in probability attributed to a one-unit increase in a given pre-
dictor is dependent both on the values of the other predictors and the starting
value of the given predictors. Thus, the duration coefficient decrease means
that the higher the duration, there is a decrease in the predicted probability of
0.016 for full repayment. With the amount increase, there is an increase in the
predicted probability of full repayment by 0.0002. The number of individuals
has the same effect as its OLS counter part: with every increase of individuals
there is a decrease in predicted probability of full repayment by 0.037. As for
the number of training hours, it has a decrease in predicted probabilities of full
repayment by 0.0073 for every increase in terms of hours.
We now apply a logit fit on our newly generated variable.
Table 7.4: Logit
Case Odds Ratio P-value
Duration 0.974 0.115
Amount 1 0.003
Number of individuals 0.939 0.178
Training hours 0.987 0.159
Source: author’s computations.
If we observe the odds ratio for every variable, we can see that they are all
very close to 1. The odds ratio for the duration is 0.97, thus increasing the
number of months for a loan will decrease the probability of full repayment
by 3%. The amount variable has too little variation in its odd ratio; therefore
there is not much difference on the full repayment probability. The odds ratio
for the number of individuals is 0.939, which means that increasing the number
of individuals will decrease the probability of full repayment by 7%.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
As mentioned previously, microcredit in developed countries face different chal-
lenges than in developing countries and these challenges are to use funds re-
ceived effectively in a way that benefits the poor directly and indirectly whilst
not exceeding cost of supply, to be an alternative social investment and to im-
plement programs to improve quality and reduce costs. “Microfinance has the
potential to reduce the consequences of financial crises and increase stability’1.
The objective of this paper was to observe the impact of microcredit and to
confirm the effect of the multiple factors as well as business training over the
reimbursement rate. Following the current mentality of microcredit in Quebec,
it will not be self-sustainable in a near future, since it is strongly supported by
the government in its costs. Nevertheless, we observe the need and demand for
microcredit in Quebec. The data on the portrayal of individuals who seek loans
explain this need. Poverty is still an issue and there is a limit to what charity
can do. The RQCC completes its mission to assist the poor in offering them
the tools to construct and participate in the society. The data on the loans
and funding reflect the direct and indirect impact on society. It has become
an alternative investment for socially conscious bodies that wish to promote
empowerment and solidarity. As mentioned previously, MIV’s can also be a
healthy investment choice regarding return and risk. Microcredit has proven
itself to be efficient in its sphere and provide extra support to society. Its main
factor, training, is not only a monitoring recourse, but also an implementation
that levels up society.
The group lending schemes analysis provides information with which char-
1Dalan, G.R.E. & Srnec, K. (2010). The Scenario of Microfinance in Latin America
Against the International Financial Crisis. Agricultural Economics â¿“ Czech, 56(12): 583-
590.
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acteristics the repayment rates should increase. We differentiated from previous
studies by analyzing the effect of group loans in a developed country. We can
also consider the fact that the data for group loans in Quebec is scarce and
there are noticeably fewer group loans compared to individual loans in devel-
oped countries. For a more significant study we would require very precise data
on the group loan members repayment share in addition to more observations.
For efficient repayment rates, group loans should be of shorter duration, of
bigger sizes and with fewer individuals. The training hours that accompany
the loans are always welcome, although there should be a cost effective imple-
mentation. The cost of training and monitoring individuals should not surpass
the return of a loan, even when the government covers these costs. We wish to
stress out that these results should be taken lightly, because of the nature of
the data and small amount of observations used in this research.
As seen with the probit and logit models, the probabilities of full repayment
of a loan are characterized by the same variables that can be found in the re-
estimated model.
Finally, we cannot make sound conclusions about group loans mostly be-
cause of the small size of the data, but we can make assertions on the fact that
microcredit in Quebec has positive effects on the society that can be enhanced
by socially responsible investments. It is too early to say if a commercialization
model would be beneficial for microcredit or if it would hinder its mission. We
can ask furthermore to extend this research, if the transformation of a funding
based on donations to one that is based on investments would be good for the
community.
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Appendix A
Questions
Questions asked to the RQCC institution; answers directly translated by the
author from French to English.
1—What are the most common reasons why individuals come to
seek a loan with microcredit? (i.e.: why do they see you instead of
a bank?)
People come to us because they do not have access to conventional bank
loans (due to lack of collateral, non-existent or flawed credit, need for small
amounts, lack of business experience, etc.). Often they do not have access to the
standardized programs of institutions that support entrepreneurship (do not
have the minimum amount to deposit, does not fit with the geographical areas
and sectors, or either certain groups of age are prioritized by the government
bodies, etc.).
Community credit is, in this sense, a last resort for people excluded and
/ or marginalized and who want to take their place in society through an
entrepreneurial project. However, this last resort often becomes a first leverage
mechanism, which then gives them access to other sources of funding because
the money from the microcredit can be considered as a personal investment.
Our funding is necessarily coupled with individualized support that is re-
quired to guarantee repayment. This support combines support for the indi-
vidual and his project. The clientele served acquires the skills related to the
business in terms of life skills and know-how. Our support secures the period
before starting a well-crafted project and shaping a competent contractor, as
well as after the beginning of the repayment of debt and the sustainability of
the company.
I invite you to read the first pages of our annual report (http://www.rqcc.qc.ca/images/rqcc/publications/rqcc%25
A. Questions II
20Report%25 20annuel%25 2011-12-web.pdf) detailing more features of Com-
munity credit. Also, a short video produced by the RQCC explains very well the
principle of Community Credit (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gtmkSttqlwM).
2—Why is there 83% of the data missing for the ethnocultural
community?
It is new data we started compiling 2 years ago. Previously, the only data
we had on the subject was of Native ethnicity.
3—Do you notice a difference in reimbursement rates from indi-
viduals with higher education?
When my member organizations of the RQCC make their accountability,
they send me the overall data as you can see in the file. It is not as a PivotTable.
So I cannot do a correlation on an individual basis. According to the flexibility
of their database, some members may be able to hold this information.
4—In the distribution of the loans, we observe the cumulative
total amount of loans to be 9 980 447$, but under total project costs
we see 57 308 643$. There seems to be a huge difference in loans and
costs, is this normal?
Loans from members of the RQCC often come as seed funds or loan guar-
antee. The participation of community credit allows a more important contri-
bution than of financial arrangements. The local support offered often ensures
the success of the company. Overall, for every dollar invested by the RQCC
has attracted investments of $ 5.74 from other socio-economic actors in the
environment, which increases the real impact of community credit and proves
its complementarity and its roots in the medium.
5—What are the main reasons a project needs refinancing and
what are the criteria that need to be passed for this to be approved?
The main reasons are the purchase of equipment to meet the increasing
demand, the need for cash or working capital or project diversification. Some-
times even once started, the contractor still has no access to alternative sources
of credit. Sometimes the relationship of trust with the counselor encourages
the contractor to remain within the RQCC. The Contractor must still provide
a business plan and forecasts. It remains the same style of accompanying from
the 1st time.
A. Questions III
6—The number of businesses created versus the amount main-
tained is rather low (40%). Can you explain why businesses fail so
much? (i.e.: Is it because a lack of training?)
Among the clients served in our bodies, some have an idea / business plan
and are at the stage of the business plan. We then accompany to validate the
project, assess the viability and finalize the business plan. From the point of
view of compilation, we contribute to the creation of a new company (with
or without loan). In addition, when a customer arrives to our members and
is already in business, he is also entitled to the support for his consolidation
project or development for his existing business. That is why, from the point
of view of compilation, we say that our work has helped to maintain existing
business. So you can see that companies created and maintained are not the
same.
7—The job retention rate is higher than the business retention
rate. Can you explain why?
The same logic applies to jobs created and maintained as for businesses
created and maintained. The new jobs are not the same as the maintained
ones. The loans will either help in creating a job or help to maintain a job.
There is no type of tracking when it comes to newly created jobs.
8—Most of your loans convert into the service sector. Can you
explain why there are so little in other sectors?
A large proportion of entrepreneurs assisted by community credit have cho-
sen self-employment. I presume that the services sector is more appropriate for
this category of self-employed entrepreneurs.
9—How do you evaluate the retention rate and creation rate of
businesses and jobs that do not require a loan?
The same principle as in question 6 applies here.
10—Can you explain the 69% survival rate?
In Quebec, the average survival rate after 5 years is 34% (data from the
Government of QC). We believe that the local support that we provide before
and after the loan makes the entrepreneur better equipped and stronger to get
through the difficult period of the first business year, which explains our high
survival rate.
A. Questions IV
In general, how long you continue to follow a company / individual after
their loan is reimbursed?
Indeed, a company or individual is followed on a regular basis through-
out the term of the loan, but then it is more sporadic (not mandatory) as
required. These customers are often invited to participate in networking ac-
tivities, or they are asked to share their experiences and their journey during
special events. In other words, it remains in contact with the contractor, but
in another form.
11—What do the total sales of 6 161 689$ represent exactly?
This is the same as question 4, but only for 2011-2012 ($ 57M is the cumu-
lative 13 years). This is the total financial package of all the projects we have
funded.
12—How does formation really work? How much are “teachers”
paid and what are the costs of preparing an individual for a loan?
In our jargon, we speak of advisors and not teachers. Community credit is
not an approach to classroom training, but support for every customer from a
support plan based on the needs and the person / project consistency. Once
the business plan is completed, a loan committee analyzes it. In our analysis
process, we consider conventional indicators, while adding specific parameters
from our institution. Our commitment to inclusion should not alter our an-
alytical rigor. Our operating budget (including salaries) is largely funded by
the Quebec government, particularly the Ministry of Finance and Economics.
This statement recognizes our specialized expertise, which combines support
for people in impoverished areas and entrepreneurial development. The RQCC
is a leader in social and economic development in Quebec.
13—According to the human resource hours, there aren’t many
hours given to training compared to the other categories. Can you
explain why?
Overall, 40% of the time is devoted directly to contractors. However, mem-
ber organizations are independent entities; they must devote time to task man-
agement and marketing communications. Most of our member organizations
are very small teams and each must put their shoulders together to carry out
these tasks.
14—We observe various sources of funding. How does this system
A. Questions V
work? Do you pitch to institutions every year to secure donations?
Can you especially explain the donations from the religious entities?
The RQCC receives an operating grant from the Ministry of Finance and
Economy for the operations of member organizations and permanence. This
funding covers a good part of the operations, but members must balance their
budget by seeking other sources of funding, each in its region. Furthermore, as
the money lent to entrepreneurs does not originate from grants, our members
are constantly raising funds in their respective communities. Religious com-
munities are interested in the dimension of ’poverty reduction’ or ’care of the
person itself (empowerment)’ in our mission. This is why many members can
strive.
15—In what way does the provincial and federal government sup-
port you? What is their current stance on microcredit from your
point of view?
Part of the answer lies in the question above: The RQCC receives an op-
erating grant from the Ministry of Finance and Economy for the operations
of member organizations and permanence. This funding covers a good part of
the operations. Community credit as we do (microcredit and support) is recog-
nized in government strategies because it responds to a vacuum of services and
funding. It is therefore a complementary and an essential actor on the board
in support of entrepreneurship and poverty reduction.
You responded to the provincial government, but what will it federal? Do
you deal with it?
Some federal agencies fund some of our members through certain programs,
including through the Canadian Women’s Foundation (for my organizations ex-
clusively women), Canada Economic Development (for my organizations wish-
ing to develop services in English to English-speaking clients in their territory)
and Industry Canada (through a revitalization program for the territories).
This funding reflects the desire of improvement and diversification of sources
of income for our members.
Appendix B
Raw Data
B. Raw Data VII
Source: author’s research.
B. Raw Data VIII
Source: author’s research.









Figure D.1: OLS regression with robust std. All variables included
Source: author’s research.
D. Stata Output XIII
Figure D.2: OLS regression with robust std. significant variables in-
cluded
Source: author’s research.
Figure D.3: Probit with significant variables included
Source: author’s research.
D. Stata Output XIV
Figure D.4: Logit with significant variables included
Source: author’s research.
